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THAWING THE FREEZE: CUTTING COSTS AND 
INCREASING EFFICIENCY BY GRANTING 
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE PRIORITY TO 
NONQUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS 
ABSTRACT 
Disputes over priority claims in bankruptcy proceedings are common 
because they are often the only way to recover assets from the limited pool 
available to claimants. Claims for professional fees for those who facilitate 
bankruptcy proceedings after the petition has been filed are given high priority 
to ensure that they have incentive to complete their work. However, those who 
come into bankruptcy with claims against the debtor have a much harder time 
recovering their costs if they do any work to assist with the proceedings. 
Currently, the administrative expense analysis requires these applicants to 
demonstrate that they made a substantial contribution to the estate before 
receiving priority on their claims for reimbursement. Courts overwhelmingly 
deny requests for administrative expenses under § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code 
because the applicant did not make a quantifiable benefit to the estate.  
This Comment calls upon the Federal Judiciary and Congress to allow 
administrative expense priority for reasonable expenses to applicants who 
benefit the estate without being duplicative, self-interested, or meritless, but are 
unable to directly quantify how they did so. For applicants and their attorneys, 
this Comment serves as a guide on requesting administrative expense priority 
for costs incurred when a direct benefit cannot be shown.  
The current substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to show why 
it should not require a benefit to be quantifiable. First, the types of potential 
applicants for this priority claim will be analyzed to demonstrate how each can 
benefit the estate in ways that are not quantifiable under the current 
interpretation of § 503(b)(3)(D). The language that courts commonly use to 
convey the rationale of a substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to 
show that precedent does not preclude the proposed interpretation. An 
interpretation is provided for the existing text of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow 
courts to make this change on a case by case basis. Finally, a change to the text 
of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow Congress to implement this change directly 
is provided as a model.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy estates, by definition, do not have enough assets to cover all 
debts and expenses.1 As a result, costs are prioritized by § 507 of the Bankruptcy 
Code (Code) to ensure that the assets of the estate are distributed in order of 
importance.2 First priority is given to the repayment of professionals that 
facilitate proceedings because their work is essential for the debtor to make it 
through bankruptcy quickly and efficiently.3 These highly prioritized 
repayments are classified as “administrative expenses” and they ensure that 
those who keep the estate running smoothly are not discouraged from 
participating due to a fear of not receiving payment.4 
Other administrative expenses, however, are given second priority by 
§ 507.5 These include the costs incurred by a variety of interested parties: 
creditors,6 indenture trustees,7 equity security holders,8 and committees 
representing creditors or equity security holders.9 This group will be collectively 
referred to as “applicants” below. Those who qualify as applicants under 
§ 503(b)(3)(D) only receive repayment if they show that their expenses were 
 
 1 An estate with sufficient assets to cover all expenses would have no use for discharge and would have 
no reason to enter the bankruptcy process.  
 2 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2019). 
 3 In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., 401 B.R. 656, 662 (D. Del. 2009). 
 4 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977). 
 5 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2019). 
 6 A creditor is defined as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before 
the order for relief concerning the debtor” by 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2019). Entities with claims against the 
estate of a kind specified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i). Community claims are also 
creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10).  
 7 An “indenture trustee” is “the person or institution charged with the fiduciary duty of carrying out the 
terms of an agreement under which bonds or debentures are issued[.]” Mark A. Cohen, Reimbursement of 
Indenture Trustees for Substantial Contribution Under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 647 (1991) (citing [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1988)). The term indenture is defined as “mortgage, deed of trust, or 
indenture, under which there is outstanding a security, other than a voting-trust certificate, constituting a claim 
against the debtor, a claim secured by a lien on any of the debtor’s property, or an equity security of the debtor.” 
11 U.S.C. § 101(28) (2019). The term indenture trustee is defined as a “trustee under an indenture.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(29) (2019).  
 8 Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(16) (2019), the term “equity security” means “(A) share in a corporation, 
whether or not transferable or denominated ‘stock’, or similar security; (B) interest of a limited partner in a 
limited partnership; or (C) warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share, 
security, or interest of a kind specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph.” The term “Equity Security 
Holder” is defined as the “holder of an equity security of the debtor” by 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (2019).  
 9 Committees representing creditors and equity security holders can apply for administrative expense 
reimbursement under the same provision as the parties they are representing. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D). 
However, this section does not allow for the repayment of administrative expenses for committees created under 
11 U.S.C. § 1102, which use a different standard for reimbursement under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(F).  
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“actual and necessary” and incurred while making a “substantial contribution” 
to the estate.10 
This approach, although reasonable on the surface, has caused an 
unnecessary problem within bankruptcy litigation: the “substantial contribution” 
analysis has been interpreted to only allow administrative expense priority for 
claimants who can show that they made a benefit to a bankruptcy estate that is 
“quantifiable,” meaning that the benefit must be measurable and have directly 
contributed assets to the bankruptcy estate.11 However, significant benefits can 
be conferred that are difficult or impossible to quantify under this standard.  
The substantial contribution analysis in Matter of D’Lites provides a good 
illustration of what is not considered a quantifiable benefit under the current 
standard.12 In Matter of D’Lites, the applicant, Walton Investments, Inc., ran the 
debtor’s business using Walton employees in an attempt to keep the company 
afloat.13 Although this provided the estate with the benefit of a workforce that 
operated the business as it wound down, the court held that it did not constitute 
a substantial benefit to the estate in part because it could not be quantified.14 
The court then compared the facts with those of a case heard by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.15 In Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, the applicant 
“instituted a marketing program which significantly increased occupancy rates 
and monthly income” at the debtor’s property.16 While the applicants in both 
cases made an effort to benefit the estate, only the applicant in Park Terrace was 
awarded administrative expenses because he was able to quantify the benefit he 
conferred.17 This Comment proposes that an applicant who is unable to directly 
quantify a benefit to the estate should be granted administrative expense priority 
for reasonable expenses spent on good faith efforts to increase the value of the 
estate.  
The proposed increase in the number of applicants who qualify for 
administrative expenses must be reconciled with the purpose of limiting priority 
in the first place. There are many reasons for having limits imposed on the range 
 
 10 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3) (2019). 
 11 See In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (“[Applicant] insists that the 
continued operation of the business increased the value of D’Lites assets at the time of sale, but it does not 
quantify the benefit to the estate.”). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 354 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, 852 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 14 In re D’Lites of Am. Inc., 108 B.R. at 356. 
 15 Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.  
 16 In re D’Lites of Am. Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019). 
 17 Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d at 1023. 
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of possible claims against the bankruptcy estate: § 503 is intended to balance 
competing interests in this context––on the one hand, promoting meaningful 
creditor participation––on the other hand, minimizing costs to the estate.18 
Therefore, courts have an interest in preventing administrative costs from 
“mushrooming,”19 and excluding claims that are “duplicative,”20 solely 
motivated by self-interest,21 or create meritless legal actions.22 
It is possible to recognize and endorse the restrictions above and still permit 
non-quantifiable benefits to a bankruptcy estate to be honored and repaid. When 
creditor participation can be encouraged while lowering costs to the estate, both 
aims of § 503 can be met simultaneously. Creditors who benefit the estate in 
ways that smooth the bankruptcy process, lower costs, foster collaboration, etc. 
should have the opportunity to recover reasonable costs for their efforts.  
The current requirement that a benefit be quantifiable before priority is 
granted is problematic because it does not give applicants an incentive to assist 
in the administrative process. Instead, applicants face a “chilling effect”23 
because they are afraid to “throw good money after bad.”24 With a small and 
manageable change in this area of the law, however, this problem can be 
eliminated without significant additional burdens being imposed on the 
bankruptcy process.  
This Comment proposes a solution that requires only a small adjustment in 
the language or interpretation of § 503(b)(3)(D) but will result in increased 
judicial efficiency, shortened cases, and the more efficient use of resources. 
Allowing applicants to show that they benefited the estate in new ways will keep 
the competing interests of § 503 balanced25 because not only will more 
 
 18 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977). 
 19 See In re Alert Holdings Inc., 157 B.R. 753, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing In re S & Y 
Enterprises, LLC, 480 B.R. 452, 459 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012)); In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 
273, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (citing In re Alert Holdings Inc., 157 B.R. at 757) (suggesting that if the court 
is not careful, administrative expense claims could eat up more and more assets of an estate until there is nothing 
left for creditors).  
 20 See In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 23 “In addition to their own expenses, creditors may owe compensation and expenses to attorneys and 
accountants they have hired to facilitate workable solutions to reorganization. The prospect of paying expenses 
without reimbursement is daunting when one considers that most creditors ultimately will collect mere pennies 
on the dollar.” Edward A. Stone, Encouraging Creditor Participation: Integrating the Allowance of 
Administrative Expenses with the Common Fund Theory, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 223, 223 (1998). 
 24 Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1393 (1993) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 92 (1977)). 
 25 See Leidos Eng’g, LLC v. Kior, Inc. (In re Kior, Inc), 567 B.R. 451, 459 (D. Del. 2017). 
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applicants have an incentive to participate in proceedings, but costs of 
administering the estate will decrease as well.  
This Comment calls upon the Federal Judiciary and Congress to allow 
administrative expense priority for reasonable expenses to applicants who 
benefit the estate without being duplicative, self-interested, or meritless but are 
unable to directly quantify how they did so. For applicants and their attorneys, 
the following serves as a guide on requesting administrative expense priority for 
costs incurred when a direct benefit cannot be shown.  
The current substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to show why 
it should not require a benefit to be quantifiable. First, the types of potential 
applicants for this priority claim will be analyzed to demonstrate how each can 
benefit the estate in ways that are not quantifiable under the current 
interpretation of § 503(b)(3)(D). The language that courts commonly use to 
convey the rationale of a substantial contribution analysis will be discussed to 
show that precedent does not preclude the proposed interpretation. An 
interpretation is provided for the existing text of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow 
courts to make this change on a case-by-case basis. Finally, a change to the text 
of § 503(b)(3)(D) that would allow Congress to implement this change directly 
is provided as a model.  
A. Participation is Worth Promoting 
This Comment does not suggest that courts should allow administrative 
expenses to all applicants, as this would almost certainly lead to estates being 
bombarded with frivolous claims. Instead, it proposes that judges read 
§ 503(b)(3)(D) to allow for reasonable compensation for applicants who benefit 
the estate in a manner that cannot be quantified to an exact figure. The small 
amount of time spent working out how much an applicant has benefited the 
estate will be offset by the benefits of having more efficient parties take on 
administrative tasks. Creating new avenues for applicants to receive 
administrative expense priority will also incentivize behavior that adds value to 
the estate indirectly.  
Providing applicants an incentive to benefit the estate will result in faster 
cases, larger recoveries, and more debtors exiting bankruptcy without being 
liquidated.26 When applicants are in a better position to facilitate bankruptcy 
 
 26 Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 308 (1995) (discussing the promotion of creditor 
participation specifically but the concept applies to all types of applicants).  
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proceedings, they should not be encouraged to do so in exchange for nothing. 
Applicants should be given an incentive to participate, especially when doing so 
will reduce costs and increase efficiency. Preventing an applicant from receiving 
fair pay for work done reduces the efficiency of the bankruptcy system and 
overall participation.  
While applicants are eligible for administrative expenses under the current 
interpretation of the law, it is rare that they will be reimbursed unless they 
demonstrate a quantifiable benefit to the estate. By allowing for new ways of 
showing how an applicant benefited the estate, the bankruptcy system will 
ensure that tasks are being completed by the most willing and capable party.  
B. Section 503(b)(3) is Drafted Ambiguously, Leaving Room for Courts to 
Implement this Solution Without Overturning Precedent 
The Code’s administrative expenses statute, 11 U.S.C. § 503, provides in 
relevant part: 
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administrative 
expenses, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title, 
including . . . (3) the actual, necessary expenses, other than 
compensation and reimbursement specified in paragraph (4) of this 
subsection, incurred by . . . (D) a creditor, an indenture trustee, an 
equity security holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity 
security holders other than a committee appointed under section 1102 
of this title, in making a substantial contribution in a case under 
chapter 9 or 11 of this title.27 
Subsection D outlines the types of applicants that are eligible to receive 
administrative expenses under the § 503(b)(3)(D) analysis. Each potential 
applicant has a different route to be granted a substantial contribution. Each 
category of applicant is discussed below.  
C. The Solution Proposed by this Comment Applies to any § 503(b)(3)(D) 
Applicant 
Administrative expenses may be granted for four types of applicants who 
have made a “substantial contribution” to a bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(b)(3)(D). Applicants may include: creditors,28 indenture trustees,29 equity 
 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2019).  
 28 See supra note 6. 
 29 See supra note 7. 
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security holders,30 and committees representing creditors or equity security 
holders.31 Such administrative expenses receive increased priority to “encourage 
applicants to participate in the liquidation or reorganization of the estate.”32 
However, this goal is in direct tension with the “contrasting policy that 
administrative expenses of the estate be kept to a minimum.”33 As a result, 
Section 503(b)(3)(D) is narrowly construed to provide expenses only when the 
applicant is found to have made a “substantial contribution” to the estate.34 
Rather than suggesting that the substantial contribution requirement be 
removed from Section 503(b)(3)(D), this Comment suggests expanding the 
requirement slightly to include contributions that may not be able to be 
quantified to an exact figure.  
Currently, the substantial contribution analysis limits the benefits that courts 
are willing to consider for administrative expenses to those that directly add 
quantifiable funds to the bankruptcy estate. Adding resources is just one of the 
many ways that an applicant can provide a benefit to the estate. The numerous 
other ways for applicants to benefit the estate should be promoted through the 
through the reward of administrative expenses.  
Many of these benefits can be provided by any of the four applicant types. 
Any applicant could resolve an ambiguity in a case such as determining the 
proper value of a disputed item. Any applicant could allow the estate to continue 
operating as usual.35 Any applicant could help draft and confirm a plan 
submitted by the debtor36 or propose a plan that is confirmed when the debtor 
has failed to do so.37 The temperature of a case could be “cooled off” by any 
applicant who “prevent[s] excess[] litigation and encourages[es] cooperation.”38 
Even urging for the appointment of a trustee can confer a benefit upon the 
estate.39  
 
 30 See supra note 8.  
 31 See supra note 9. 
 32 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977). 
 33 In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 103 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D) (2019). 
 35 In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 273, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (citing In re 
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1420 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 36 Id. (citing In re Richton Int’l Corp., 15 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)); In re Baldwin–United 
Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 340–41 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)). 
 37 In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. at 282 (citing In re Jelinek, 153 B.R. 279, 281 (Bankr. 
D.N.D. 1993)). 
 38 Id. (citing Matter of Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 343 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)). 
 39 Id. (citing In re Paolino, 71 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)).  
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1. Creditors 
Creditors have many ways to participate in bankruptcy proceedings that 
confer a benefit to the estate that are not quantifiable. There are several examples 
of courts finding that a creditor’s nonquantifiable benefit constituted a 
substantial contribution in a Comment previously published in this journal: 
Encouraging Creditor Participation: Integrating the Allowance of 
Administrative Expenses with the Common Fund Theory.40  
Creditors are often in a good position to detect fraud and bring it to the 
debtor’s attention. “The Fifth Circuit held that causing a debtor to change its 
reorganization plan and recovering a fraudulent transfer that resulted in a $3 
million increase in the value of the property of the estate was a substantial 
contribution to reorganization.”41  
Creditors are familiar with inside information that can be helpful to 
determine logistical problems with litigation. “One creditors’ committee 
attorney successfully prevented a debtor from retaining counsel with a conflict 
of interest problem, potentially saving the estate unnecessary expenses, and the 
court held this constituted a substantial contribution to the estate which entitled 
the creditor to reimbursement.”42 
Creditors can play an active role in the confirmation of a reorganization plan, 
cutting costs and reducing wasted time in the process. “Another bankruptcy 
court found a substantial contribution when an applicant’s efforts resulted in the 
successful confirmation of a plan which provided for full payment to all creditors 
over the Debtor’s proposed plan which provided for picayune or token 
payments . . . .”43 
This Comment proposes that the many nonquantifiable benefits conferred 
by creditors should be considered a substantial contribution and granted 
administrative expense priority.  
Creditors are in a difficult situation from the outset of a bankruptcy case 
because they are seeking recovery of debts owed to them by the debtor.44 To 
make matters worse, creditors must use their own resources to participate in the 
 
 40 Stone, supra note 23. 
 41 Id. (citing In re DP Partners, Ltd., 106 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 42 Id. (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 176 B.R. 815, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)). 
 43 Id. (citing In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 44 See id. at 223. 
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proceedings and can be reluctant to “throw good money after bad.”45 As a result, 
“[d]enying administrative expense priority to creditors who have out of pocket 
expenses creates a potentially chilling effect on creditor participation in the 
reorganization process.”46 According to U.S. Trustee William Neary, promoting 
creditor participation in bankruptcy “would be well worth the effort; cases could 
move faster, creditor recoveries could be increased and a larger number of 
debtors might be salvaged.”47  
2. Indenture Trustees 
An indenture trustee is like a stakeholder whose duties and obligations are 
exclusively defined by the terms of an indenture agreement.48 An “indenture 
agreement” is a contract made between a trustee and a bondholder that represents 
the bondholders’ interests.49 This agreement also includes the rules and 
responsibilities of the parties.50 
An indenture is a type of interest that a party may have that is defined by a 
contract made between a bond issuer and a trustee that represents the 
bondholder’s interests. The indenture trustee represents those interests by 
highlighting the rules and responsibilities of the parties.  
An indenture is a mortgage, deed of trust, or similar, under which there is an 
outstanding security constituting a claim against the debtor, a security interest in 
the debtor’s property, or an equity security of the debtor.  
Indenture trustees are individuals or institutions charged with the fiduciary 
duty of carrying out the terms of the contract between the bond issuer and bond 
holder.51 The term “debentures” may also be used, but “[n]o formal legal 
distinction has developed concerning the terms ‘bonds’ and ‘debentures,’ but 
‘bonds’ generally refers to secured long-term debt obligations, and ‘debentures’ 
to unsecured long-term debt obligations.”52 
 
 45 Stripp, supra note 24, at 1340 n.25 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977)). 
 46 Stone, supra note 23, at 223.  
 47 Gross & Richmond, supra note 26, at 308.  
 48 Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 26 N.E.2d 801 (N.Y. 1940). 
 49 See Stewart M. Robertson, Debenture Holders and the Indenture Trustee: Controlling Managerial 
Discretion in the Solvent Enterprise, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461 (1988). 
 50 See id. 
 51 Cohen, supra note 7 (citing [Bankruptcy Reform] Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549).  
 52 Robertson, supra note 49, at 461 n.2.  
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Indenture trustees become a part of the reorganization process when the 
debtor defaults on its obligations according to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.53 
The Trust Indenture Act was created after the financial collapse of 1929 “to 
account for what in many cases appeared to be its flagrant disrespect for the 
rights of security holders prior to and during the administration of default 
proceedings.”54 
Indenture trustees should be encouraged to meaningfully participate in the 
bankruptcy process because they often play a significant role in the confirmation 
or opposition of the reorganization plan.55 Congress has specifically outlined 
that assisting the confirmation of a reorganization plan is sufficient grounds for 
a finding of a substantial contribution.56 Furthermore, “Congress acknowledged 
that indenture trustees benefit the reorganization of an estate by their very 
participation under fiduciary standards.”57 
Indenture trustees often play “a significant role in the initiation of the 
proceeding,58 as well as in the formulation of, opposition to or confirmation of 
the debtor’s plan of reorganization.”59 As the confirmation or denial of the 
reorganization plan can make the difference between a debtor surviving a 
bankruptcy or being liquidated through chapter 7, indenture trustees are often in 
a position to make a substantial contribution to the estate. However, these 
contributions are currently being precluded from administrative expense priority 
because they are nonquantifiable.60 
3. Equity Security Holders 
Equity security holders hold some equity interest of the debtor in a 
bankruptcy case. Equity security or equity interest can include shares of a 
corporation or an interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership. It can also 
include the right to buy, sell, or subscribe to a share in a corporation or 
partnership. These individuals or entities may vote on a plan of reorganization 
 
 53 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa–77rrr (1988). 
 54 Robertson, supra note 49, at 461 n.2.  
 55 Cohen, supra note 7 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988)).  
 56 See S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 66–67 (1978). 
 57 In re Multiponics, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (E.D. La. 1977) (discussing expenses being granted 
under Section 242 of the Code).  
 58 Cohen, supra note 7, at 647 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988)).  
 59 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977)). 
 60 A useful guide on how substantial contribution claims by indenture trustees should be treated is 
outlined by Cohen supra note 7, at 674. 
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and may file a proof of interest. Like other applicants, they hope to recover their 
interest in the bankruptcy estate.  
Equity security holders can substantially contribute to the estate without it 
being quantifiable in much the same way that creditors can. The ability to take 
part in the reorganization vote alone makes them candidates for administrative 
expense priority because they can facilitate that process and substantially benefit 
the estate.61 
4. Committees Representing Creditors or Equity Security Holders 
Groups of creditors and equity security holders can be represented by 
committees. These committees can benefit the estate in the same manner as the 
parties they represent. Official committees are regulated by the Code and often 
directly participate in chapter 11 reorganization plans. Courts are split on the 
issue of allowing official committees to be reimbursed for their costs and 
expenses incurred in making a substantial contribution.62 Unofficial or ad hoc 
committees are not regulated and act just as a group of creditors or equity 
security holders would. 
Courts have held that official committees appointed under chapter 11 are 
entitled to administrative expenses because of implied authority. Other courts 
“presume” that expenses from official committees are reimbursable.63 However, 
official committees have been totally precluded from receiving administrative 
expenses from still other courts.64 Those courts preclude official committees 
from recovering under § 503(b)(3)(D) because they are already granted 
attorney’s fees and expenses statutorily.65 
Although this discussion is outside the scope of this Comment, the principle 
that any applicant who provides a substantial contribution to the estate should 
be granted an administrative expense does include official committees. 
Committees may substantially contribute to the estate just as their individual 
members would, but often do so on a larger scale. In practice, a substantial 
contribution was found when an attorney representing a creditors’ committee 
 
 61 See S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 66–67 (1978). 
 62 Compare In re Grynberg, 19 B.R. 621, 622–23 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982), with In re Major Dynamics, 
Inc., 16 B.R. 279, 280 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). 
 63 In re Western Co. of North America, 123 B.R. 546 (N.D. Tex. 1991). 
 64 In re Auto. Nat’l Brands, Inc., 65 B.R. 412 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).  
 65 Id. at 415. 
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prevented a debtor from retaining counsel that would have created a conflict of 
interest in the proceedings that could cost the estate unnecessary expenses.66 
Each of the four types of applicant can substantially contribute to the estate 
without having that contribution be quantifiable. When conducting the 
substantial contribution analysis, the language used by courts does not require 
the benefit be quantifiable, so applicants should not be denied recovery on that 
ground.  
D. All Applicants Should Have the Opportunity to Recover Reasonable 
Expenses Incurred to Indirectly Benefit the Estate  
Nonquantifiable benefits should not be automatically excluded from the 
substantial contribution analysis solely because they cannot be quantified. 
Maximizing the estate’s assets67 without directly adding funds still benefits the 
bottom line. Expediting the case68 reduces all expenses and allows all creditors 
to receive payment in less time. Implementing an incentive plan is often more 
easily accomplished by an applicant than by a debtor,69 saving time and money 
for the estate. An applicant cooperating with creditors can also provide major 
benefits to the estate without directly increasing its assets.70 Negotiating the 
resolution of the confirmation hearing is a major challenge for debtors and is 
often only possible through the efforts of applicants.71  
While it is currently unusual for applicants to confer a benefit upon the 
estate, providing additional methods of securing administrative expense priority 
would incentivize this in the future. Most applicants cannot risk investing time 
and effort into increasing the value of an estate when they are overwhelmingly 
denied recovery. This Comment proposes that applicants should not be 
automatically excluded from administrative expense priority because no direct 
benefit to the estate can be shown. Instead, courts should allow applicants to 
demonstrate how their efforts conferred a benefit upon the estate indirectly and 
grant administrative expense priority to those who can show such benefit.  
 
 66 Stone, supra note 23, at 227 (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 176 B.R. 815, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1995)). 
 67 Id. at 248. 
 68 Gross & Redmond, supra note 26, at 308 (trustee Neary argues that increasing creditor participation 
will lead to, among other benefits, faster case administration).  
 69 Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (2007). 
 70 Stone, supra note 23, at 233. 
 71 Steere v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 98 F.2d 889, 891 (3d Cir. 1938) (assisting with the confirmation 
plan has been seen as a benefit to the estate for almost 100 years).  
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This solution does leave open another ambiguity that must be addressed. To 
compensate an applicant for conferring a benefit upon the estate that cannot be 
quantified, the value of that compensation must be determined. This Comment 
proposes that courts should grant administrative expense priority to applicants 
for reasonable costs incurred while making a good faith effort to benefit the 
estate. These indirect benefits should result in compensation even if they appear 
to result in a net monetary loss for the estate. Costing the estate money in one 
area while saving it more money in another can easily result in a significant 
benefit for the estate.  
When an applicant acts in good faith to benefit the estate, there is a 
possibility that the applicant’s actions will decrease the assets in the estate. For 
example, an applicant who resolves an ambiguity may discover that the value of 
the assets in the estate was less than initially projected. While the estate’s value 
has been directly reduced, the applicant has nonetheless indirectly benefited the 
estate by resolving that issue before it could cause additional problems. The 
court should not bear the cost of resolving ambiguities when the debtor wants 
the true value to remain unknown. Instead, the estate should compensate the 
applicant for reasonable costs incurred when resolving this ambiguity.  
Allowing reasonable compensation for indirect benefits should be restricted 
to when the applicant is acting in good faith. Applicants should not be rewarded 
for intentionally trying to lower the value of the estate out of their own self-
interest. The good faith requirement here is imposed because applicants should 
be rewarded for trying to increase the value of the estate for the benefit of 
everyone involved in the bankruptcy proceedings. When that goal is being 
furthered, courts should not automatically bar the applicant from recovering 
some expenses through administrative priority solely because the benefit cannot 
be quantified.  
Although rare, significant benefits to the estate that cannot be quantified 
should be encouraged. Applicants that confer benefits should not be excluded 
from administrative expense consideration because they did not directly add 
value to the estate. Instead, applicants should have the opportunity to seek 
reasonable compensation for their good faith efforts by showing that they 
indirectly benefited the estate.  
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E. Neither the Text of 503(b)(3)(D) nor the Interpretations Provided by 
Common Law Require a Benefit to Be Quantifiable to Be a Substantial 
Contribution 
Congress drafted 11 U.S.C. § 503 without the term “quantifiable.”72 
However, courts have interpreted the phrase “substantial contribution” in 
section 503(b)(3) inconsistently.73 While this issue has been litigated and a 
wealth of opinions exist that shed light on a clear meaning, different 
interpretations are used by jurisdictions around the United States. While the 
requirement that a substantial contribution be quantifiable has been read into the 
text of § 503 (b)(3)(D), each core phrase described below has room to allow 
applicants to recover for indirect benefits as proposed by this Comment.  
1. The Core Phrases Used by Courts in Substantial Contribution Analysis 
Do Not Require that the Benefit to the Estate Be Quantifiable 
The definition of a substantial contribution is inconsistent,74 “which 
consequently requires the courts to construe it in each individual case as a matter 
of judicial discretion, without the benefit of clear congressional guidance.”75 
Several “core phrases” are recited frequently in opinions dealing with substantial 
contributions. This language is used by courts to describe what a substantial 
contribution applicant must show. Unfortunately, the phrases often overlap, 
cause confusion, and prevent parties from participating in proceedings because 
of uncertainty. These core phrases include terms such as “foster,”76 “enhance,”77 
“demonstrable,”78 “indirect,”79 “incidental,”80 “minimal”81 and “benefit.”82 
Despite their ubiquity, they offer little guidance to an applicant deciding whether 
to participate in bankruptcy proceedings.83 
 
 72 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2019). 
 73 See Stone, supra note 23, at 227–28. 
 74 See generally In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting In re 
Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 2006)). 
 75 Stone, supra note 23, at 226. 
 76 Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood (In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.), 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
 77 Id. 
 78 In re Texaco, Inc., 90 B.R. 622, 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 79 In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).  
 80 See In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 251 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). 
 81 See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 79 B.R. 321, 341 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). 
 82 See id. 
 83 Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 n.152.  
HINDERLEIDER_7.15.20 7/16/2020 1:57 PM 
2020] THAWING THE FREEZE 449 
Although this confusing language is the most commonly used standard for 
the substantial contribution analysis, some courts are already looking to expand 
the definition. One court stated that “[i]t would be inequitable and unfair to deny 
[the applicant] any compensation from the debtor’s estate” even though the Code 
provided no direct avenue for recovery.84 The court also suggested that the 
language most often used by that jurisdiction, “Foster-and-Enhance-Rather-
than-Retard-or-Interrupt-the-Reorganization-Process,” was just one possible 
basis for compensation under § 503.85 
No matter the jurisdiction, room exists to allow for benefits to the estate that 
are not quantifiable to be given administrative expense priority. A selection of 
core phrases that are used commonly across the country is provided below.  
a. “Direct Benefit” 
The direct benefit rule is grounded in congressional language86 and is the 
oldest and most ambiguous of the core phrases. It is a requirement that has been 
read into the text of § 503 that benefits to the estate must be direct to be 
considered a substantial contribution for administrative expense purposes. While 
it provides little guidance on its face, this rule has been developed into more 
specific language over the years. For example, one court considered (among 
other factors) “whether the applicant provided a ‘direct, significant, and 
demonstrably positive benefit’ to the estate. . . .”87 
The phrase “substantial contribution” is “derived from §§ 242 and 243 of the 
former Bankruptcy Act.”88 When utilizing or analyzing the direct benefit 
requirement, courts often cite the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 that provides, “[the direct benefit rule] does not require a 
contribution that leads to confirmation of a plan, for in many cases, it will be a 
substantial contribution if the person involved uncovers facts that would lead to 
a denial of confirmation, such as fraud in connection with the case.”89 This 
 
 84 Id. at 677 n.153 (citing In re Glade Springs, Inc., 77 B.R. 184, 196 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987), vacated, 
826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987)). 
 85 In re Glade Springs, Inc., 77 B.R. at 194, vacated, 826 F.2d 440 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 86 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 355 (1977). 
 87 Stone, supra note 23, at 227 (quoting In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11, 15 (Bankr. D. Del. 
1993); In re Alert Holdings, Inc., 157 B.R. 753, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing In re FRG, Inc., 124 B.R. 
653, 658 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991)); In re Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 112 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)). 
 88 In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 566 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595, at 355 (1977); In re Grynberg, 19 B.R. 621, 623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (“[Section] 503(b)(3)(D) is the 
progeny of § 243 . . . .”). 
 89 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977) (cited by In re Grasso, 519 B.R. 137, 142 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2014); Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 945 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
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language is the oldest “test” used to understand the substantial contribution 
analysis and has been developed over the years into more precise rules and 
requirements.  
b. “Significance” 
Generally, the “Significance Test” is when a court “focuses upon the degree 
or significance of the contribution being considered.”90 Under this test, 
applicants are required to show that they contributed “[s]omething more than 
minimal assistance to the estate. . . .”91 Courts using this language require that 
the entities seeking reimbursement “prove that the expenses resulted in a 
significant and tangible benefit to the estate[.]”92 
Some courts use the Significance Test as a “threshold measure to assess 
whether further inquiry is required.”93 Jurisdictions using this approach require 
an applicant’s services to “reach a significant level” before proceeding further 
with the substantial contribution analysis.94  
Other courts consider the significance of a benefit alongside the rest of the 
substantial contribution analysis.95 This interpretation “parallels” the benefit to 
the estate test,96 placing a focus on the benefit to the estate being “tangible.”97 
The requirement that a benefit be “significant” is prevalent in the few 
opinions that delve into the relationship among the Code, the Trust Indenture 
Act and their legislative histories.98 These opinions hold that this relationship 
requires the applicant to show an “actual direct and demonstrable benefit” to the 
estate.99 This is a common core phrase used by many other opinions as well.100 
 
 90 In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). 
 91 Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 (citing In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 Bankr. 246, 253 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); see also In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 Bankr. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) 
(applicant must prove both significant and tangible benefits). 
 92 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356. 
 93 Cohen, supra note 7, at 677.  
 94 Id. (citing In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. at 253); see also In re D’Lites of Am., 
Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (applicant must prove both significant and tangible benefits). 
 95 In re 9085 E. Mineral Office Bldg., Ltd., 119 B.R. at 253; see also In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 
at 356 (the applicant was required to prove that the benefit was both significant and tangible). 
 96 Cohen, supra note 7, at 666. 
 97 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356.  
 98 See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Tr. Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 422; In re Pacific Homes, 20 
B.R. 729, 749–50 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982); In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 366 F.Supp. 1376, 1387–88 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). 
 99 Mark A. Cohen, Reimbursement of Indenture Trustees for Substantial Contribution Under Section 503 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 667 (1991).  
 100 See, e.g., In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014); In re Energy 
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The strict language of the Significance Test requires the benefit to be 
conferred on “the debtor’s estate, the creditors, and to the extent relevant, the 
stockholders.”101 Similar language was used by one district court in the First 
Circuit that required “a measurable and valuable benefit to the Debtor’s 
estate.”102 
Some courts require that those looking for reimbursement of administrative 
assets “demonstrate that their services were exceptional.”103 However, it does 
not follow that services that cannot be quantified can never provide an actual 
and demonstrable benefit or be exceptional enough to receive an allowance. 
i. Case Analysis 
Further analysis of this test is required because there is a specific split in 
authority that is worth highlighting. The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia distinguished facts that satisfied the significance test from 
those that would not in In re D’Lites of America, Inc.104 In In re D’Lites, the 
applicant, Walton Investments, Inc., began running the debtor’s business using 
Walton employees in an attempt to keep it operational and ultimately worth 
more.105 The court compared the facts there with those of a case heard by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Park Terrace.106 In Park Terrace, the 
applicant “instituted a marketing program which significantly increased 
occupancy rates and monthly income” at the debtor’s property.107  
From the facts presented so far, both applicants took actions intending to 
make the estate more valuable. Before looking at how the court reached its 
conclusion in In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., it is important to establish that Walton 
Investments made two loans of $250,000 and replaced D’Lites employees for 
the purpose of purchasing the company.108 There is a split of authority on the 
issue of considering a creditor’s motives when conducting a substantial 
 
Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 132–35 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2006). 
 101 In re Granite Partners, 213 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Stone, supra note 23, at 252 (citing 
Haskins v. United States (In re Lister), 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 102 In re Boston and Me. Corp., 62 B.R. 199, 203 (D. Mass. 1986). 
 103 Matter of W.T. Grant Co., 85 B.R. 250, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. In re W.T. Grant Co., 119 B.R. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d sub nom. In re W.T. Grant Co. 935 F.2d 1277 
(2d Cir. 1991). 
 104 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989). 
 105 Id. at 354 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses v. Wilds, 852 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 106 Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019.  
 107 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019). 
 108 Id. at 354. 
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contribution analysis.109 The vast majority of jurisdictions “deny reimbursement 
where the applicant’s actions are self-interested and duplicative.”110 An 
applicant acting in their own interest is sufficient evidence to deny the claim 
here because this court adheres to the ruling that an applicant is not entitled to 
administrative expense priority when acting in its own interest rather than the 
interest of the estate.111  
Two key distinctions were made by the court in In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 
with the first providing a good illustration of the current understanding of a 
“significant” benefit to the estate. This opinion will be used to illustrate how the 
interpretation of the substantial contribution proposed by this Comment is 
consistent with current precedent. Also, remember, this analysis was used by the 
court to demonstrate that Walton Investments, Inc. was acting out of personal 
interest, not that these issues would preclude administrative expense priority 
otherwise.  
The applicant in Park Terrace was awarded administrative expenses because 
he “provided a significant and tangible benefit to the estate by maintaining, 
upgrading and remodeling the debtor’s rental units, and by increasing occupancy 
rates and monthly income[.]”112 The applicant in In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 
however, “sustained approximately $700,000.00 in losses during its operating 
effort [to keep the business afloat.]”113 The applicant “insist[ed] that the 
continued operation of the business increased the value of [the debtor’s] assets 
at the time of sale,” but the court was unwilling to award administrative expenses 
because the applicant did not “quantify the benefit to the estate.”114 
This comparison provides an opportunity to illustrate how this Comment 
proposes to change the interpretation of the substantial contribution analysis. 
The applicant in Park Terrace made a substantial contribution to the estate under 
the current understanding because he increased occupancy rates and monthly 
income.115 The applicant in In re D’Lites did not make a substantial contribution 
under the current understanding because the business lost money due to its 
 
 109 In re 1250 Oceanside Partners, 519 B.R. 802, 807 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2014) (citing In re Cellular 101, 
Inc., 377 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004)).  
 110 Cohen, supra note 7, at 647, 672–73 n.163.  
 111 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 357 (citing In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988); In re 
Patch Graphics, 58 B.R. 743, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986); In re McK, Ltd., 14 B.R. 518, 520 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1981)) (“When a creditor incurs expenses primarily to protect its own interests rather than the interests of the 
estate, the creditor is not entitled to a priority claim.”).  
 112 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356 (citing Park Terrace Townhouses 852 F.2d 1019. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019. 
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efforts. However, both applicants provided benefits to the estate that cannot be 
quantified.  
The Park Terrace applicant maintained, upgraded and remodeled the 
debtor’s rental units which led to the significant benefit to the estate.116 The In 
re D’Lites applicant provided $500,000 in loans and staffed the failing business 
with new employees.117 These applicants both contributed unquantifiable 
benefits to the estate that should be considered when awarding administrative 
expenses.118 If the Park Terrace townhomes lost money after the applicant 
renovated them due to unrelated circumstances, he would not be able to point to 
a “quantifiable” benefit to secure administrative expense priority.119 Similarly, 
D’Lites lost money under Walton Investments despite its efforts to turn the 
business around.120 The substantial contribution analysis should include actions 
taken by the applicant that positively impact the debtor’s estate, including but 
not limited to generating additional assets. Allowing applicants to recover 
reasonable expenses (as opposed to actual expenses) for clear indirect benefits 
will reduce the chilling effect on participation and encourage meaningful 
participation for all. Even if an applicant loses money because of their efforts, 
allowing reasonable expenses for their good faith effort prevents a total loss.  
c. “Tangible Benefit” 
This language, along with the “actual-direct-and-demonstrable-benefit test,” 
have manifested as more precise evolutions of the traditional “benefit-to-the-
estate test.”121 Both tests appear to be grounded in the Chandler Act,122 which 
amended the bankruptcy code in the United States as it existed in 1938.123 
Sections 64a(l), 242 and 243 of the Chandler Act served as the basis for § 503(b) 
of the 1978 Code.124 As both tests are rooted in the original language that formed 
§ 503 of the modern Code, their “differences are based almost exclusively on 
the terms that courts select to define the type of benefit necessary to satisfy the 
substantial contribution standard.”125 Following the common theme in this area 
 
 116 See id. 
 117 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. at 356. 
 118 See id.; Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019. 
 119 See generally Park Terrace Townhouses, 852 F.2d 1019. 
 120 In re D’Lites of Am., Inc., 108 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989). 
 121 Cohen, supra note 7, at 650.  
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 655. 
 124 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 355 (1977). 
 125 Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 n.20. 
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of the law, what separates the practical use of these tests is merely conflicting 
judicial interpretation.  
The phrase tangible benefit,126 like actual and demonstrable benefit, requires 
a material benefit to be made to the estate.127 A requirement that a benefit be 
material should not mandate that it be quantifiable. The tangible benefit 
requirement is currently interpreted to mandate quantifiable benefits before a 
substantial contribution is found,128 but this should be changed. There is no 
statutory language that ties “tangible” with “quantifiable.” While some 
precedent compares the two terms, they can easily be distinguished.129 
This Comment argues that a benefit can be material without being 
quantifiable in many circumstances. Reducing costs to the estate is a material 
benefit but is not quantifiable under the current interpretation in many 
jurisdictions. Improving the marketing outreach and consumer perception of a 
brand can provide a major material benefit to a debtor, but putting a number on 
these figures requires expensive guesswork. Rather than requiring a quantifiable 
benefit, courts should instead allow for applicants to demonstrate how they have 
benefited the estate and allow for reasonable compensation for their efforts.  
Unlike the language described above, the following tests are not rooted in 
legislative language or intent but judicial creations.130 Both tests “look to the 
overall effect on the reorganization process due to the claimant’s actions” rather 
than adhering to the language provided by Congress.131 
d. The Preference That the Benefit “Foster-And-Enhance-Rather-Than-
Retard-Or-Interrupt-The-Reorganization-Process” 
The vague language of this phrase allows courts to interpret the substantial 
contribution analysis as needed on a case-by-case basis. Relying on this 
language grants courts the freedom to “employ notions of equity, fairness[,] and 
judicial independence to interpret the text of [§] 503 and develop standards to 
judge or justify questionable or controversial fee and expense awards or to 
 
 126 Stone, supra note 23, at 252 (citing In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 176 B.R. 815, 819 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1995); In re Jack Winter Apparel, Inc., 119 B.R. 629, 633 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1990)). 
 127 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 670. 
 128 In re New Power Co., 311 B.R. 118, 126 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004). 
 129 In re W.T. Grant Co., 119 B.R. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The Second Circuit has recognized the 
“lodestar” principle whereby a basic per hour rate is multiplied by a factor which takes into account both results 
achieved and quality of services rendered.”). 
 130 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 650 (“The foster-and-enhance-rather-than-retard-or-interrupt-the-progress-
of-reorganization test and the but-for test seem to be judicial creations less rooted in legislative action.”). 
 131 Id. at 650 n.21. 
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support a claim of fostering and enhancing the process of reorganization.”132 
This vagueness “signifies a judicial reaction to the lack of congressional 
guidance in the statutory language of [§] 503.”133 
A more liberal approach to the role of judicial discretion gives courts the 
ability to bend this test to allow applicants to recover benefits that do not fit 
exactly within the confines of § 503.134 A more conservative view, however, 
limits the court’s discretion to the “well-established construction of the 
statute.”135 It would be easiest to make the proposed change of the language in 
§ 503 to the liberal view, as it allows for the broadest level of discretion.  
i. Case Analysis 
This “foster and enhance” language was used by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in the frequently cited case, In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc.136 
There, the Court cites to commonly used language that administrative expense 
priority should be granted because “services which substantially contribute to a 
case are those which foster and enhance, rather than retard or interrupt the 
progress or reorganization.”137 The Court goes on to discuss when compensation 
is denied, citing to the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of New York: 
“Compensation has been denied where the services rendered by the creditor or 
shareholder were only ‘remotely related to the reorganization[.]’’’138 The 
reasoning behind this is that, “a creditor’s attorney must ordinarily look to its 
own client for payment, unless the creditor’s attorney rendered services on 
behalf of the reorganization, not merely on behalf of his client’s interest, and 
conferred a significant and demonstrable benefit to the debtor’s estate and the 
creditors.”139 Whether services relate to the reorganization independent of 
selfish interests is a fine indicator for whether administrative expense priority 
should be granted. Additionally, this indicator has nothing to do with whether 
the services are quantifiable.  
 
 132 Id. at 671 (citing to In re K-FAB, Inc., 118 Bankr. 240, 242 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (“[F]ee determination . . . 
must be a consideration of the overall ‘fairness and reasonableness’” of the fee under all of the circumstances). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. (citing Grundy Nat’l Bank v. Rife (In re Rife), 71 Bankr. 129, 131 (Bankr. W.D. Va.)). 
 136 In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re White Motor Credit 
Corp., 50 B.R. 885, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (internal quotations omitted).  
 137 Id. 
 138 In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253 (citing In re Gen. Oil Distrib., Inc., 51 B.R. 794, 806 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)).  
 139 In re Gen. Oil Distrib., Inc., 51 B.R. at 806 (emphasis removed). 
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Like the analysis of the In re D’Lites and Park Terrace cases above, In re 
Consolidated Bancshares, Inc. provides an opportunity to demonstrate how the 
solution proposed by this Comment would be incorporated into a real set of 
facts.140 As illustrated above, there are several issues with the applicant’s request 
that serve as the basis for denial of the request. 
First, the applicants were a group of attorneys seeking compensation for 
services that were also completed by the court-appointed equity security holders’ 
committee.141 These services, performed after the appointment of the equity 
security holders committee, were therefore duplicative in time and effort, a fact 
that was fatal to their request for administrative expense priority.142 
Second, the applicants were motivated by a personal interest, not for the 
benefit of the chapter 11 estate.143 As discussed above, a showing that the 
applicant was primarily motivated by personal interest rather than the benefit of 
the estate is fatal to administrative expense priority.144 
Third, the action that the applicants performed was meritless.145 As the state 
lawsuit became property of the estate once the bankruptcy petition was filed, 
“the lawsuit could have been dismissed for lack of a proper party plaintiff, i.e., 
the debtor, and therefore had little value to the bankruptcy estate.”146 
This Comment does not propose to eliminate the issues in this case listed 
above from serving as sufficient evidence to deny administrative expense 
priority. Instead, focus on the fact that the court had three distinct rationales to 
decide the case on and still chose to cite “Foster-and-Enhance-Rather-than-
Retard-or-Interrupt-the-Reorganization-Process” language.147 Including this 
language serves no purpose in this decision and should be viewed as dicta. 
Instead, this has been cited numerous times for that exact language in other 
administrative expense cases.148 
 
 140 In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1253. 
 141 Id. at 1252. 
 142 See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014); In re Energy Partners, 
Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 132–35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2006). 
 143 In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1252. 
 144 See generally In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Patch Graphics, 58 B.R. 743, 746 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986) (“When a creditor incurs expenses primarily to protect its own interests [rather than 
the interests of the estate,] the creditor is not entitled to a priority . . . claim.”). 
 145 In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1252. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See generally Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994); Batiste v. Sun Kona Fin. 
I, LLC, No. CV 15-00397 ACK-KSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4936 at *5 (D. Haw. Jan. 12, 2017). 
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This language was cited by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re 
Cellular 101, Inc.149 There, the Court cited this language when determining if a 
bankruptcy court had made an error by granting administrative expense priority 
to an applicant that proposed the only reorganization plan that was put before 
it.150 Assisting the successful implementation of a reorganization plan was 
specifically laid out by Congress as a substantial contribution to the estate.151 As 
the only plan submitted to the bankruptcy court was proposed by the applicants, 
they were clearly instrumental in its success.  
This test does not clarify the substantial contribution analysis for courts, 
applicants, or debtors. It appears to be a statement devoid of meaning that is 
added to justify whatever analysis a court has decided to conduct. For 
jurisdictions using this language, judges have total freedom to interpret it as 
allowing administrative expense priority to applicants that have made a 
substantial contribution without being able to quantify it. The broad language of 
this test should be used to allow for administrative expenses for applicants who 
fostered and enhanced the reorganization process, regardless of whether their 
contribution can be quantified. 
e. “But-For” 
This language is based in tort law and is rarely used by courts in an 
administrative expense context. Regardless, some courts require a showing that, 
but for the actions of the applicant, the efforts of the case would be substantially 
diminished.152  
This test demonstrates how widely the approaches of courts have varied and 
“illustrates the lack of unity in the standards and creates a possibility of unjust 
results because of the emphasis on different factors.”153 Regardless, a but-for 
standard, if used by a court, should allow administrative expenses for applicants 
who benefited the estate, even if that benefit cannot be quantified. 
 
 149 In re Cellular 101, Inc., 377 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Consolidated Bancshares, 
Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See S. REP. NO. 95-598, at 66–67 (1978) (“The phrase ‘substantial contribution in a case’ . . . does not 
require a contribution that leads to confirmation of a plan, for in many cases, it will be a substantial contribution 
if the person involved uncovers facts that would lead to a denial of confirmation . . . .”). 
 152 Cohen, supra note 7, at 677 (internal quotations omitted). 
 153 Cohen, supra note 7, at 672. 
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The Fifth Circuit uses a cost-benefit analysis developed from a wide range 
of opinions dealing with substantial contributions.154 This analyzes substantial 
contributions on a case by case basis and requires that courts “weigh the cost of 
the claimed fees and expenses against the benefits conferred upon the estate 
which flow directly from those actions.”155 Those benefits that are only 
conferred upon a portion of the estate are diminished in weight by the analysis 
and are less likely to receive expenses.156  
F. The Phrase “Actual and Necessary” in Section 503(B)(3) Does Not 
Require That the Benefit to the Estate Be Quantifiable 
The analysis above focused on the requirement that an applicant 
substantially contribute to the estate but there are other requirements that must 
be met as well. While this Comment focuses primarily on § 503(b)(3)(D), all 
requirements of § 503(b)(3) must be met before subsection (D) is considered.  
Section 503(b)(3) of the Code requires that applicants prove their benefit to 
the estate was actual and necessary.157 The language used by courts when 
making this determination is discussed below.  
1. The Four Main Ideas by Courts in “Actual and Necessary” Analysis Do 
Not Require That the Benefit to the Estate Be Quantifiable 
Each of the following factors preclude an applicant from receiving 
administrative expense priority because they are fatal to a claim that the 
contribution was actual and necessary. 
First, the court weighs the cost of administrative expense repayment against 
the benefit conferred by the applicant.158 A substantial contribution is more 
likely to be found if the benefit conferred by the applicant exceeds the cost that 
the applicant seeks to assess against the estate.159 
 
 154 See, e.g., In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 273, 281 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005). 
 155 In re DP Partners Ltd. P’ship, 106 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 156 Id. 
 157 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3) (2019).  
 158 See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 780–81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014); In re Energy Partners, 
Ltd., 422 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 132–35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2006). 
 159 See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. at 80; In re 
Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. at 132–35. 
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Second, the benefit is scrutinized to ensure it was not the result of duplicative 
efforts, which would allow multiple applicants to get paid for the same result.160 
Courts are reluctant to find that a contribution was necessary when the 
applicant’s efforts were duplicative of efforts undertaken by statutory 
fiduciaries.161 This requires judges to “scrutinize claimed expenses for waste and 
duplication[,]”162 but allows freedom to make this determination however they 
see fit.163 
Third, it is usually fatal for a substantial contribution claim if the applicant 
is found to have negatively impacted the estate through their efforts.164 A finding 
that the applicant had a negative effect on the case is often fatal to an 
administrative expense claim.165 This is a broad category and can include 
detrimental actions such as making questionable objections to pleadings filed by 
the debtor or engaging in some other improper conduct that caused the debtor to 
incur costs or that delayed resolution of a case. 
Fourth, administrative expenses are usually denied if the applicant’s 
participation was primarily motivated to benefit themselves rather than the 
estate.166 However, “[m]ost activities of an interested party that contribute to the 
estate will also, of course, benefit that party to some degree, and the existence 
of a self-interest cannot in and of itself preclude reimbursement.”167 
Regardless of the applicant’s ability to quantify a benefit, administrative 
expenses should not be granted if the applicant’s contributions have a negative 
impact on the estate. While applicants can take a risk that may or may not work 
out in favor of the estate, there must be an agreement between the parties before 
this takes place. Allowing administrative expenses for an applicant that 
unilaterally decides to gamble in the proceedings regardless of the outcome goes 
 
 160 See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. at 80; In re 
Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. at 132–35. 
 161 See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 422 B.R. at 80; In re 
Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. at 132–35. 
 162 In re DP Partners Ltd. P’ship, 106 F.3d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 163 Id. (citing In re Lister, 846 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1988)).  
 164 See In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. at 780–81. 
 165 See id. 
 166 In re Kior, Inc., 567 B.R. 451, 459 (D. Del. 2017) (citing Lebron v. Mechem Fin. Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 
944 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
 167 Lebron v. Mechem Fin., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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against the purpose of § 503168 and will inevitably lead to “mushrooming” 
expenses.169 
This Comment does not propose to alter the requirement that a benefit be 
actual and necessary to the estate. Instead, this analysis should be left alone and 
treated as separate from the substantial contribution analysis discussed above. 
When courts describe the analysis of the actual and necessary requirement 
alongside the substantial contribution analysis, language from both can be 
conflated. As discussed in the substantial contribution breakdown above, this 
leads to confusion of courts, applicants, and debtors alike.  
G. Benefits of the Solution Proposed by this Comment 
The solution proposed by this Comment will further the competing goals of 
bankruptcy and increase judicial efficiency without significant change or effort. 
Both benefits are discussed below.  
1. This Solution Furthers the Competing Goals of Bankruptcy 
Section 503 of the Code is understood to apply to a narrow set of 
circumstances because it must balance promoting meaningful participation with 
keeping costs to the estate to a minimum.170 Both goals will be met if substantial 
contributions include benefits to the estate that do not quantifiably increase its 
assets. It is established that substantial contribution awards are uncommon, as 
they are “reserved for those rare and extraordinary circumstances when the 
creditor’s involvement truly enhances the administration of the estate.”171  
The rarity of these expenses is indicative of how hard it is for an applicant 
to show that they substantially contributed to a case. More applicants who meet 
both goals of § 503 should be reimbursed for their efforts because everyone 
benefits as a result. This would further the goal of § 503(b)(3)(D) “to encourage 
activities that will benefit the estate as a whole[.]”172 When applicants benefit 
the estate more than their expenses will cost, there is a net gain for the debtor. 
Even if the value of the payment to the applicant is adjusted to account for the 
 
 168 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 355 (1977) (“Those who must wind up the affairs of a debtor’s estate 
must be assured of payment, or else they will not participate in the liquidation or distribution of the estate.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 169 In re Am. Plumbing & Mech., Inc., 327 B.R. 273, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005).  
 170 In re Kior, Inc., 567 B.R. at 459. 
 171 Id. (citing In re RS Legacy Corp., No. 15-10197, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 854, at *1, *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Mar. 17, 2016). 
 172 Stone, supra note 23, at 234 (quoting Lebron v. Mechem Fin., Inc., 27 F.3d 937, 944 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
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premium on liquid assets for a debtor, applicant contributions can outweigh 
administrative expense costs.173 Failure to compensate applicants for their 
efforts goes against the goals of § 503(b)(3)(D) and reduces the efficiency of 
bankruptcy proceedings.174  
a. Judicial Efficiency 
Encouraging applicants to meaningfully participate in proceedings, 
especially in circumstances where their participation will provide a benefit to 
the estate, will create a more cooperative bankruptcy process and allow 
bankruptcy judges to spend more time on the more complicated matters in a 
case. Judges should be willing to allow the most qualified parties to participate 
in proceedings, regardless of the party. If a creditor is the best candidate to 
wrangle the various parties who will be voting on the reorganization plan, that 
creditor should be allowed to do so with the assurance that reasonable costs will 
be paid for its efforts.  
b. By Addressing Problems Earlier in a Case, Applicants Save Precious 
Time and Money 
Congress intended for § 503 to promote meaningful creditor participation 
while keeping costs of the estate to a minimum.175 This goal is only satisfied if 
applicants—and the attorneys representing them—are provided with meaningful 
incentives. Administrative expenses provide a significant benefit, but are rarely 
granted.176 The risk that these expenses will not be recovered makes 
participating in bankruptcy proceedings a difficult choice to make.177 A court 
refusing to grant administrative expenses when a significant contribution is 
made unjustly enriches the debtor.178 
In situations where an applicant makes a substantial contribution to the 
estate, an analogy can be drawn to a medical emergency.179 When a medical 
professional assists an injured party in an emergency, there are two justifications 
 
 173 In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 505 B.R. 770, 782–84 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014). 
 174 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 186–87 (1977); see generally In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 103 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5262 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1991). 
 175 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 18687 (1977). 
 176 Stone, supra note 23, at 223. 
 177 Id. at 248 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 116 (AM LAW 
INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1936)). 
 178 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 116 (AM. LAW INST., 
Proposed Final Draft, 1936)). 
 179 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1936)). 
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for why the party should compensate the professional for their services. First, 
the injured party would—if able—undoubtedly agree to pay for the procedure.180 
The second is that, in an emergency, delaying treatment would be harmful to the 
party.181  
A similar situation occurs when an applicant for administrative expenses 
confers a substantial contribution on the estate by exposing a problem that would 
cost the estate.182 When a problem is solved before it arises, it is difficult to 
determine how much of a benefit the applicant conferred upon the estate. 
Although no assets were put into the estate, the cost of addressing the problem 
after it arose gets offset, benefitting the bottom line.  
The debtor would almost certainly rather pay the applicant for its efforts than 
allow the reorganization to fail. While some issues may be fixable but expensive, 
others would cause the case to be dismissed or transferred to chapter 7. 
Additionally, as bankruptcy cases move quickly, waiting for court approval 
before acting may result in significant costs to creditors and the estate. 
H. Alternative Solutions 
Though bankruptcy courts have the discretion necessary to implement this 
change through their broad § 105 authority,183 other solutions may achieve the 
same result. Finding new ways to quantify benefits previously precluded 
because they were nonquantifiable is one such solution. Implementing the 
common fund doctrine is another alternative that would achieve the results 
suggested by this Comment. Courts may also alter their definition of what 
constitutes a tangible benefit and make these changes on a case-by-case basis. 
Allowing applicants themselves to make this argument is a similar solution that 
places the burden on litigants rather than the judiciary. Judicial interpretation 
can be altered in several ways, including § 105184 discretion. Finally, a direct 
change to § 503 by Congress would be the most direct way to implement the 
change proposed by this Comment.  
 
 180 Id. at 248–49 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final 
Draft, 1936)). 
 181 Id. at 249 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, 
1936)). 
 182 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 116 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, 1936)). 
 183 See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2019). 
 184 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019). 
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1. Implementing New Methods of Quantifying Benefits 
While courts can easily alter what constitutes a quantifiable benefit, the same 
result will occur when implementing new methods of quantification.  
a. A Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Be Used to Quantify Some Benefits, 
Especially Those That Save the Estate Money Rather Than Increasing 
Its Assets 
A cost-benefit analysis that considers nonquantifiable contributions to the 
estate will allow all applicants who assist the estate to be rewarded for their 
efforts while preventing unnecessary costs to the estate. Increasing the assets of 
the bankruptcy estate is a well-established way to receive administrative 
expenses. If an applicant can show their efforts saved substantially more assets 
of the estate than their expenses suggest, they should be entitled to 
administrative expenses.185 After all, “[a] penny saved is a penny earned.”186 
A good faith component would also discourage poor behavior by applicants. 
The In re Adelphia Communications Corp. court rewarded negative conduct 
when it granted a bondholder group administrativse expenses for making 
motions that, if granted, would have been disastrous for creditor recovery.187 
Their efforts caused other groups to invest in the proceedings, leading to 
increased assets for the bankruptcy estate.188 Although this contribution would 
meet the proposed cost-benefit analysis, this kind of behavior should not be 
encouraged by bankruptcy courts.  
The Fifth189 and Ninth190 Circuit already use a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether a substantial contribution has been made. Allowing 
applicants to demonstrate that their efforts benefited the estate more than the 
expenses they seek would not add a great deal to the judicial workload and would 
greatly increase efficiency.  
 
 185 See In re Living Hope Se., LLC, 509 B.R. 649 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2014) where a bankruptcy trustee in 
a chapter 7 case was entitled to administrative expense priority in a subsequent chapter 11 case because he made 
a substantial contribution to preserve assets that belonged to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate when he persuaded 
the court to appoint a chapter 11 trustee. 
 186 E. Nesbit, The Robber and the Burglar, PALL MALL MAG. 107 (1899). 
 187 In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 159 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 188 Id. at 160. 
 189 In re Consolidated Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 190 In re Cellular 101, Inc., 377 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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b. The Common Fund Doctrine Can Be Used as an Alternative Method 
and Rationale for Granting Recovery to Applicants 
A solution similar to the cost-benefit analysis was discussed in Encouraging 
Creditor Participation: Integrating the Allowance of Administrative Expenses 
with the Common Fund Theory.191 The Supreme Court created the common fund 
doctrine in Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough.192 There, 
attorneys who brought in additional funds for a class were allowed payment from 
those assets.193 The Court reasoned that a trustee in this scenario would have 
been granted expenses from the increased funds and that the attorney had 
provided the same benefit.194 
Implementing the common fund doctrine to the administrative expense 
analysis would allow for any quantifiable increase in assets to be used to pay 
applicants, but it can also be applied to nonquantifiable benefits. Once an 
applicant has shown a substantial contribution to the estate, the applicant will 
then need to prove that the benefit the estate received is greater than the expenses 
it seeks. If these requirements are met, the expenses can be taken out of the 
benefit that the estate received.  
c. Classifying Nonquantifiable Benefits as Tangible and Acceptable for 
Administrative Expenses Leaves Discretion to Judges While Still 
Implementing This Change 
Another solution would be to classify these indirect benefits as quantifiable 
and allow the judicial branch to sort out which benefits qualify. This shifts the 
burden to the court and may require some additional time and effort to be 
invested, but the resulting increase in judicial efficiency across the board will 
negate the impact of making these determinations.  
If codified into a statute, the language may look like this:  
(1) In a proceeding where at least one interested party may not recover 
the full value of its claim, an applicant will be presumed to have made 
a tangible benefit to the estate if: 
 
 191 Stone, supra note 23, at 223. 
 192 Trs. of the Int’l Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 
 193 Stone, supra note 23, at 238 (citing Trs. of the Int’l Improvement Fund, 105 U.S. 527). 
 194 Id. at 238–39 (citing Trs. of the Int’l Improvement Fund, 105 U.S. at 532). 
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(A) The applicant benefited the estate in a manner that cannot be 
quantified but nonetheless conferred a benefit that is greater than 
the expenses they seek.  
d. Placing the Burden of Showing that a Benefit Is Worthy of 
Administrative Expenses on the Applicant Would Require Making 
Room for Them to Make This Argument 
This change would need carve out room for an applicant to demonstrate that 
their benefit indirectly made a quantifiable contribution to the estate. Currently, 
this argument is falling upon deaf ears in all circuits and statutory language 
would be a powerful way to address it.195 The effort required would fall upon 
both the applicant to prepare this argument and the courts to make the 
determination, but the resulting increase in efficiency is worth it. A showing that 
an applicant contributed to the estate in a way that is not quantifiable but 
nevertheless made a tangible benefit would create a presumption of a substantial 
contribution.  
The language may look like this:  
(1) In a proceeding where at least one interested party may not recover 
the full value of its claim, an applicant will be presumed to have made 
a tangible benefit to the estate if: 
(A) The Applicant can affirmatively show that they benefited the 
estate in a manner that cannot be quantified but nonetheless 
substantially contributed to the estate.  
It is important that this language is drafted carefully. Administrative 
expenses must retain their narrow scope and must not be granted in many 
situations. This language is not designed to be a loophole, but a narrow exception 
that allows for applicants, that truly benefited the estate, to recover their costs. 
Unfortunately, amending the Code may not be the top priority for legislators and 
so the judicial branch will have to continue using its discretion to implement the 
best methods.  
  
 
 195 Id. at 223. 
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e. Changing the Judicial Interpretation of the Section 503(B)(3)(D) 
Analysis Is a Simple and Easy Change That Will Result in the Benefits 
Listed Above 
This Comment serves as a direct call to the federal judiciary to change the 
interpretation of the current substantial contribution analysis. Below are 
potential means for how this could be achieved using the court’s § 105 power.196 
f. Judges Do Not Have to Conduct a Different Substantial Contribution 
to Change the Interpretation of Section 503(B)(3)(D) as Proposed 
Although administrative expenses are rarely granted to applicants and are 
almost never granted to applicants who cannot demonstrate a quantifiable 
benefit to the estate, the language of the statute nor the test itself are causing 
these rejections. The requests of applicants are simply falling upon deaf ears.197 
Judges are refusing to grant recovery when there is no quantifiable benefit 
because they interpret that as failing the tangible benefit requirement. Not only 
is this requirement judge-made law that could easily be changed, the requirement 
itself does not imply that a quantifiable benefit must be shown.  
Judges across the country could easily change their interpretation without 
causing any major problems in bankruptcy proceedings. All other requirements 
that make administrative expenses rare will remain in effect, but those who 
deserve recovery would have more of an opportunity. 
g. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code Allows a Judge the Authority to 
Implement This Change in Interpretation 
Judges have the authority to invoke § 105 power to “issue any order, process, 
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out [the Code’s] 
provisions.”198 This section serves to allow judges flexibility to carry out the 
provisions of the Code, subject to some limitations. Section 105 can only be 
invoked when necessary to “preserve an identifiable right conferred elsewhere 
in [the Code.]”199 Additionally, a bankruptcy judge may not use § 105 to 
“contravene specific statutory provisions.”200 
 
 196 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”). 
 197 Stone, supra note 23, at 223.  
 198 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019). 
 199 In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 
197, 206, (1988); In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc’y, Inc., 124 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1997)).  
 200 Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014).  
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Section 105 authority can be used to interpret the substantial contribution 
requirement as allowing nonquantifiable benefits so long as there is an 
identifiable right201 and the action does not contravene any specific statutory 
authority.202  
There is an identifiable right in recovery for applicants who have conferred 
a substantial contribution to the estate under § 503(b)(3)(D). There is no 
statutory authority stating substantial contributions must be quantifiable for 
recovery.  
h. Amending the Language of Section 503(B)(3)(D) Is the Most Direct 
Method of Implementing the Proposed Change 
As § 503(b)(3)(D) is written ambiguously, there is room for Congress to 
clarify when administrative expenses should be granted. Implementing a change 
that furthers both of the twin aims of bankruptcy recognized should receive 
bipartisan support.  
i. Prescribing Specific Benefits That Qualify Ensures Certainty to 
Applicants and Requires No Extra Effort From Judges 
Implementing a change in the text of § 503(b)(3)(D) that leaves the core of 
the language intact while adding a provision that lays out specific benefits that 
qualify as administrative is one possible solution. This change would make 
applicants aware of which efforts are worth pursuing and which would not result 
in administrative expenses and require no interpretation from any party to 
enforce. 
This language may look like this: 
(1) In a proceeding where at least one interested party may not recover 
the full value of its claim, an applicant will be presumed to have made 
a tangible benefit to the estate if, 
(A) The applicant benefited the estate by 
a. reducing costs to the estate,  
b. shortening the time of the proceedings,  
c. maximizing the value of assets,  
d. proposing a reorganization plan, 
e. (etc.)  
 
 201 In re Jamo, 283 F.3d at 403 (citing Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 206; In re Ludlow Hosp. 
Soc’y, Inc., 124 F.3d at 27). 
 202 Law, 571 U.S. at 421. 
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 Congress can also use the language from § 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
that entitles a debtor to reasonable compensation for actual and necessary 
services. Section 330(a) provides:  
. . . the court may award to a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional person 
employed under section 327 or 1103 of this title, or to the debtor’s attorney— 
(1) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered 
by such trustee, examiner, professional person, or attorney, as the case 
may be, and by any paraprofessional persons employed by such 
trustee, professional person, or attorney, as the case may be, based on 
the time, the nature, the extent, and the value of such services and the 
cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title; and 
(2) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. 
 As written, this language is too broad to be implemented for applicants 
besides debtors, but it can provide a model for what the updated language should 
look like.  
The language could be tightened up to provide applicants more room to show 
a substantial contribution without allowing them the same means as a debtor.  
. . . the court may award to a creditor, an indenture trustee, an equity 
security holder, or a committee representing creditors or equity 
security holders— 
(1) reasonable compensation for a substantial contribution conferred 
upon the estate, based on the time, the nature, the extent, and the value 
of such services and the cost of comparable services other than in a 
case under this title; and 
(2) reimbursement equal to the value added to the estate.  
CONCLUSION 
The changes required to allow applicants to recover for nonquantifiable 
benefits under § 503(b)(3)(D) are easy to implement and worth the effort. 
Applicants should be given a reasonable opportunity to participate in bankruptcy 
proceedings to which they have an interest without fearing that they will be  
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throwing money away without hope of reimbursement. It is the hope of this 
Comment that reasonable change will be made to thaw the chilling effect of the 
§ 503 administrative expense analysis. 
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